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The Impact of Economic Freedom, Business Regulation and Corruption on Bank Profitability 
and Bank Stability: Evidence from Europe 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines the impact of economic freedom, regulation, corruption and transparency on bank 
profitability and bank stability using a sample of 681 European financial institutions in 33 European 
countries over the period 2000-2012. Using unbalanced panel data and 2SLS estimation, our results 
show that bank performance and bank stability are negatively related, but economic freedom, regulation, 
corruption and transparency tend to have mixed effects at the aggregate level depending on the 
profitability and stability measures used. More noticeable differential effects can be detected when we 
disaggregate the data between the Eurozone, the non-euro European Union (EU) countries and the EU 
candidate countries, the size of financial institutions, the level of country income, the timing of entrance 
into the EU enlargement process and specialization of the banks. Our results suggest that policies 
promoting greater economic freedom, reducing regulation, reducing corruption and enhancing 
transparency need to be more targeted to reflect the diversity of the banking sector in Europe. 
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1. Introduction 
The financial crisis that erupted in the United States in 2007 and spread rapidly to international markets 
has had a considerable impact on the banking sector. Moreover, the tensions from the subprime crisis 
have degenerated into a sovereign debt crisis, affecting many of the European countries. The 2008-2010 
period witnessed higher volatility in the financial markets, a negative impact upon the bank risk ratings 
and other negative repercussions for the financial sector including demands for greater regulation, 
stricter rules on proprietary trading, and greater scrutiny of banking activities and products (see for 
example Michalak and Uhde, 2012; Elliot et al., 2013; Slimane et al., 2013; and Milani, 2014). As Mayes 
(2005) pointed out prior to the financial crisis, problems in the banking sector impact not only the 
financial system but also the entire economy. In this paper we argue that the economic system of a 
country as measured by the degree of economic freedom, transparency and level of corruption is likely 
to have an impact on the banking sector itself. 
 
This paper provides an empirical investigation of the role of economic freedom, business 
regulation corruption and bank transparency on banking activity in terms performance measured by 
profitability and stability. In particular, the role of economic freedom on the banking sector has not been 
greatly studied in the existing literature except in the studies by Sufian and Habibullah (2010a and 
2010b) who look at the cases of China and Malaysia. There are reasons to think that banking profitability 
and stability is to some extent related to overall economic system and environment within which banks 
operate. Clearly some countries have more or less economic freedom, business regulation, corruption 
and banking transparency than others. A key question which we examine in this paper is whether the 
overall economic system and environment in which banks operate affects their overall performance 
measured by profitability and stability. 
 
Our paper is motivated by recent developments in the European economy and European banking 
sector and it contributes to the literature in a number of important ways. First, we develop a framework 
that examines the role of economic freedom, business regulation, corruption and transparency on both 
bank profitability and bank stability. The studies by Sufian and Habibullah (2010a and 2010b) look only 
at developing countries and focused mainly on profitability measures To the best of our knowledge this 
is the first study that attempts to examine the issues of economic freedom on both bank profitability and 
stability in a combined framework at the European level including the European Union candidate 
countries. Another novelty is that we apply several different criteria to our sample based on region, 
institutional size, the income level of the country, time of entrance into the EU and bank specialization. 
Our study uses both pre and post crisis data on all these measures making it possible to examine the 
effect of the recent economic crisis on the EU banking sector.  
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of some of the literature 
pertaining to economic freedom, transparency and corruption. Section 3 outlines the data set. Section 4 
outlines our empirical research methodology. Section 5 presents some summary statistics and section 6 
the results of the panel data analysis while section 7 concludes. 
  
2. Literature Review 
While regulatory and supervisory framework of the banking sector has been extensively studied, the role 
of economic freedom has only recently attracted the interest of researchers. In the period before the 
subprime crisis, a consensus was built around the idea that if the burden of regulation was reduced the 
banking system would operate more efficiently and perform better. In addition, there was a misplaced 
tendency to believe that self-regulation generally works better in the financial system than external 
regulation. This idea fell into disrepute as a result of the crisis, which showed that bankers left largely 
unregulated can cause havoc to the banking sector with resulting financial instability. The post-crisis 
literature has tended to emphasize the need for regulatory and supervisory reforms to ensure banking 
and financial stability with enhanced regulation, monitoring and improved bank disclosure. In their study 
Chortareas et al. (2012b) evaluate bank supervision, regulation and efficiency among a sample of 22 EU 
countries. Their results show that an increased regulatory and supervisory framework has a positive 
impact on bank profitability, through various channels, including a decline in the likelihood of financial 
distress, a reduction of agency problems and reduced market power. 
 
The impact of Economic Freedom 
While the impact of economic freedom on the wider economy has been extensively studied (see for 
example Adkins, Moomaw and Savvides, 2002; Altman, 2008; Bergh and Karlsson, 2010; Heckelman 
and Knack, 2009) its impact on the banking sector has only recently attracted the attention of researchers 
and only then in the context of developing countries (see Sufian and Habibullah, 2010a and 2010b).  
There are a number of reasons to think that economic freedom can have a positive impact on bank 
profitability. In the first instance, banks are likely to lend more as there are more firms competing in the 
economy and this means banks have the capacity to lend more funds to a wider range of domestic 
companies. Also greater economic freedom means that there will be more scope for banks to lend to 
foreign companies and foreign financial institutions which should ensure greater diversification and a 
better risk return trade-off for the banking system. Greater economic freedom is likely to lead to a better 
environment for business and hence better economic growth and therefore better banking performance 
as measured by profitability and stability. In addition, countries with higher levels of economic freedom 
generally have higher levels of real income (see Holmes et al., 2008), this should in turn lead to a higher 
demand for banking services. Also, a higher degree of economic freedom should lead to lower inflation 
and more stable macroeconomic environment. In the context of developing countries, it has been noted 
that there tends to be greater state control of bank lending decisions and this ultimately means banks 
tend to lend more to less creditworthy companies than would happen in a private sector controlled 
banking system and this  ultimately undermines banking performance. 
 
Of course, there could be some ways in which greater economic freedom might undermine 
banking performance. Easier entry into the sector and greater competition within the sector could 
undermine the average profitability of banks. In addition, greater economic freedom may allow for 
greater competition for the banking sector from other financial intermediaries such as hedge funds, 
shadow banks and private equity which may also impact on banking profitability since they compete for 
banks deposits and also to fund businesses which could in turn lower bank profitability. So the impact 
of economic freedom on banking profitability and stability is essentially an empirical matter. The 
empirical studies by Sufian and Habibullah (2010a and 2010b) indicate a positive relationship between 
economic freedom and profitability in the cases of both China and Malaysia but there are no studies for 
developed nations. 
 
The Impact of Regulation 
Many studies have emphasized the positive impact of regulation, especially the role of capital adequacy 
requirements in preventing bank failures, protecting customers and the entire economic system from 
detrimental externalities (see for example, Rochet, 1992; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1993; Gorton and 
Winton, 1995; Hovakimian and Kane, 2000; and Chortareas et al., 2012b).  
Despite the benefits of regulation it is important to find an optimal level since excessive regulation can 
obstruct the efficient operation of banks by increasing costs and restricting useful bank’s activities. In 
this respect, Jalilian et al. (2007) point out that banks may try to counteract the pressure of a severe 
regulatory framework by engaging in riskier operations and investments and finding ways to circumvent 
regulation which can negatively impact upon bank performance and bank stability. A study by Barth et 
al. (2004) evaluates the impact of a specific regulatory and supervisory strategy on bank development, 
performance and stability using survey data for an international sample of 107 countries. Their results 
indicate that restrictions on bank activities can be damaging for bank profitability and increase the 
probability of a banking crisis. Similarly, Dermirgüç-Kunt et al. (2004) examine the impact of bank 
regulations, market structure and institutions on net interest margin (NIM) and the cost of financial 
intermediation using an international dataset based on over 1,400 banks from 72 countries. The results 
obtained indicate that tighter regulation on banking activity will generate an increase in the cost of 
financial intermediation, which can adversely affect net interest margin and bank soundness. Moreover, 
Barth et al. (2012) evaluate the evolution and impact of bank regulations on a dataset of 125 countries. 
Based on an extended analysis of the pros and cons of a wide range of regulations, they argue that the 
existing evidence does not suggest that a tighter regulatory framework will improve bank stability, 
enhance the efficiency of intermediation or reduce the level of corruption. By contrast, Fernandez and 
Gonzalez (2005) who use the same time span and a similar sample show that in countries with low 
accounting and auditing requirements, more control by supervisory authorities can decrease the 
predisposition to risk taking on the part of managers and that increased restrictions on bank activities 
can decrease the probability of a banking crisis. Similarly Agoraki et al. (2011) who focus on a sample 
of 546 European banks suggests that increased regulation, through higher capital requirements and 
activity restrictions in combination with a higher level of market power reduces both credit risk and the 
risk of default.  
 
The Impact of Corruption 
 
In the banking sector financial corruption relates to the dishonest practices of bank managers and/or 
bank officials. A significant number of economists argue that corruption has a negative impact upon the 
banking and economic system. At the macroeconomic level, corruption can deform the structure of 
public expenditure, dampen potential foreign direct investment, increase unproductive foreign debts, 
lessen the efficiency of economic activity and result in a lower level of national income and higher rates 
of poverty (see for example, Mauro, 1995; Gastanaga et al., 1998; Asiedu, 2003; and Kunieda et al., 
2014). Additionally, at the microeconomic level, corruption is accompanied by low institutional quality, 
inefficient institutions in terms of performance and stability, and higher costs of doing business (see for 
example Asiedu, 2003; Méndez and Sepulveda, 2006; and Diaby and Sylwester, 2015). Consequently, 
the level of corruption has the potential to undermine bank profitability and stability. Mongid (2007) 
shows that banking crises are positively related to a higher level of corruption and poor legal 
enforcement. On the other hand Pagano (2008) shows that corruption together with a high participation 
of government in the banking environment significantly influences bank lending rates, with increased 
government participation raising lending rates while corruption lowers lending rates and that corruption 
helps to explain the cross-sectional dispersion of the lending rates sensitivities in the banking sector.  
 
When it comes to corruption the literature is more mixed on the issues of profitability and 
stability. Generally speaking a higher level of corruption can negatively influence the functioning of the 
entire financial sector and economy. La Porta et al. (2002) argue that countries with higher government 
ownership of banks are associated with lower levels of GDP per capita, to the extent that greater 
government control of the banking system is associated with higher levels of corruption; this suggests a 
negative impact from corruption on banking profitability. More recently, Park (2012) evaluates the 
influence of corruption on the soundness of the banking sector using an international dataset. The results 
show that corruption can be associated with a higher proportion of bad loans in the banking sector. In 
addition, corruption increases the allocation of bank funds from normal to bad projects which as well as 
undermining bank soundness will also negatively influence the economic activity. Similar conclusions 
are reached by Weill (2011a) and Zheng et al. (2013). However, Lalountas et al. (2011) and Weill (2011a 
and 2011b) point out that in countries with a high degree of risk aversion in the banking sector there 
could be benefits in terms of increased bank lending from an increase of corruption and in the short term 
corruption can potentially increase bank profitability. However, the observation, that corruption can 
positively influence bank lending, does not necessarily mean that corruption will bring welfare gains. 
For instance, if an expansion of banking activity is accompanied by an increase in low productivity non-
performing loans it increases risk and ultimately raises the cost of borrowing for a bank and its 
customers. In general, the legal system is the main source of variation in corruption levels across the 
regions studied, the higher the effectiveness of the judicial system, the less corruption there will be. For 
example, the higher occurrence of corruption in some developing European countries can be partly 
explained by deficiencies in their regulatory and institutional infrastructure. Corruption can also be aided 
by a lack of transparency and poor financial education which enables providers of financial services to 
exploit their customers. For example, Papademos (2008) and Blinder et al. (2008) debate the potential 
harm that a lack of transparency can have on individuals with poor financial education or lack the ability 
to understand and interpret financial information provided. In addition, Kolstad and Wiig (2009) argue 
that a lack of transparency makes corruption less risky and implicitly more attractive, leading to certain 
employees in the financial sector exploiting their positions at the expense of established social norms 
and trust.  
 
The Impact of Transparency 
We argue that regulation is highly related to the issue of transparency in the financial sector. In the 
financial system, transparency plays an important role, in terms of increasing the effectiveness of 
monetary and fiscal policies, increasing the predictability of Central Bank actions and promoting the 
independence of the Central Bank and that more transparency can play a role in linking executive pay 
to performance in the banking sector. Transparency is important both for Central Banks with regard to 
communicating monetary policy (see Winkler, 2000), and the banking sector as a whole not only because 
it augments democratic responsibility, but also because it improves public confidence regarding the 
financial sector. For example, Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) develop a theoretical model, which 
demonstrates that diminishing asymmetric information by revealing information to the public lessens a 
firm’s cost of capital. Other papers, such as Baumann and Nier (2004), Nier and Baumann (2006), 
Akhigbe et al. (2013), and Barakat and Hussainey (2013) estimate the impact of transparency on the 
banking sector by constructing a bank disclosure index. Overall increased transparency can translate into 
better financial performance, reduces the chance of severe banking problems, enhances overall bank 
stability, and better link senior executive remuneration to bank performance.  
 
In the literature there are various concepts regarding transparency, particularly concerning the 
impact of transparency in relation to the moment in time when it is promoted. As explained by Nier 
(2005), transparency can be beneficial ex ante by enhancing market discipline. By contrast, ex post 
disclosure can have a negative impact on bank performance and bank stability by highlighting when a 
financial institution is already in difficulty. This latter situation was observed in the recent financial crisis 
period when banks were forced to become more transparent during the financial crisis. A higher level of 
transparency by helping to overcome information asymmetry can improve liquidity in a bank’s shares 
and can reduce a financial institution’s cost of capital as shown in Diamond and Verecchia (1991). In 
addition, Lang and Lundholm (1993) show that increased disclosure by firms by reducing information 
asymmetry can also help reduce stock price volatility and hence improve a firms’ cost of capital. Tadesse 
(2006) argues that higher bank disclosure has benefits for the stability of the financial system and 
because it improves market efficiency by facilitating price discovery it can help uncover concealed costs 
and provide protection for investors by permitting better understanding of the risks in the banking sector 
associated with financial products. 
 
While transparency potentially generally has a positive impact on banking activity; too much 
transparency can have negative effects. Bushee and Noe (2000) argue that increased disclosure can affect 
the level of institutional holding of a firm’s shares but at the same time increase the percentage of 
“transient” institutional holders of the firm’s shares which can actually increase the price volatility of a 
bank’s shares. Cordella and Yeyatti (1998) and  Furman and Stiglitz (1998) argue that the disclosure of 
financial information can also have negative implications at times when a financial institution is already 
in distress by increasing the risk of bank runs. Excessive transparency can also lead to confusion if the 
level of financial education is poor due to the risk that the general public does not understand or cannot 
process very detailed information provided by financial institutions. It is important to mention that one 
of the main benefits of greater regulation and transparency strategy is that it helps limit the scope for 
corruption and financial fraud in banking. The complexities of modern financial institutions, the greed 
and naivety of some bank clients and the lack of financial education among ordinary people can facilitate 
financial fraud and corruption.  
Due to the recent financial crisis of 2008-2010 and subsequent Eurozone crisis substantial institutional 
and regulatory changes have been enacted, forcing bank supervisors and regulators to rethink their 
approach to the banking sector. In particular, the need to ensure a proper level of regulation and 
transparency in the banking and financial sector has been a high priority. Consequently, the role of 
regulation and transparency in evaluating bank performance and bank stability is a topic of interest for 
different actors in the financial system, especially for policy makers, bank managers and bank customers, 
but also for the general public. 
 
3. The Data Set and Measurement of Bank Profitability, Bank Stability, Economic Freedom, 
Regulation, Corruption and Transparency 
The Data Set 
The main source of our data is Bankscope and World Bank databases. However, in several cases the 
data were extracted from the annual reports of the financial institutions and were converted into euros 
to ensure accounting uniformity. Wherever possible, we have used consolidated banking data. After 
excluding financial institutions and/or periods with missing or zero values, we were left with a sample 
of 681 financial institutions. The sample covers the period 2000-2012 on an annual basis for 33 European 
countries. The time period was selected to ensure coverage of the recent financial crisis period on bank 
performance and bank stability. In many of the selected countries the banking sector plays a very 
important role, being the main component of their financial systems, see for example, Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Maksimovic (2005), and Rajan and Zingales (2003).  
 
Measurement of Profitability 
In many academic studies, for example, Bourke (1989), Molyneux and Thornton (1992), Staikouras and 
Wood (2004), Park and Weber (2006), Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007), Athanasoglou et al. (2008), 
Albertazzi and Gambacorta (2009), Millon Cornett et al. (2010), Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011), Kanas 
et al. (2012), among others, the concept of performance is related to the notion of profitability. 
Profitability can be represented by three indicators; namely Return on Average Assets (ROAA), Return 
on Average Equity (ROAE) and Net Interest Margin (NIM). ROAA indicates the returns generated by 
bank’s assets and is calculated as a ratio of net income to average total assets. ROAE shows the return 
on shareholder’s funds and is calculated as net income to average total equity. NIM is defined as the 
difference between the interest income produced by banks or other financial institutions and the volume 
of interest paid out to their lenders relative to the volume of their assets. We use all three measures of 
financial performance in our study to check for the robustness of our results. The first two variables are 
extensively used in the literature as profitability ratios, representing a financial institution's ability to 
generate earnings from its investments (see for example, Nier, 2005; Demirgüc-Kunt et al., 2004; 
Pasiouras, 2008; and Naceur and Omran, 2011). In addition, we include in our analysis the NIM as used 
in the studies by Demirgüc-Kunt et al. (2004) and Chortareas et al. (2012a). 
 
  
Measurement of Bank Stability the Financial Soundness Index and alternative Z-score 
The issue of bank stability relates to bank’s capability to endure adverse events, such as banking crises, 
major policy changes, financial sector liberalization and natural disasters (IMF). Among the academic 
writings, the most commonly used variable to assess the soundness of a financial institution or of a 
banking system, is the Z-score. The Z-score is inversely related to the probability of a bank’s insolvency, 
see Boyd and Runkle (1993). More specifically, the Z-score exposes the number of standard deviations 
that a bank’s return has to drop below its expected value, to deplete equity and make the bank insolvent  
(see Boyd and Runkle, 1993; Lepetit et al., 2008; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Chortareas et al., 2012b; 
Sufian and Habibullah, 2012; Bertay et al., 2013; Bourkhis and Nabi, 2013; Pasiouras and Gaganis, 
2013; Tabak et al., 2013; Anolli et al., 2014; and Fu et al., 2014). The probability of insolvency is 
defined as the probability that losses 𝜋 exceed equity E, as we can see in the following: 
 
𝑃[𝜋 ≤ −𝐸] = 𝑃[𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴 ≤ −𝐶𝐴𝑅] = ∫ 𝑓(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴)𝑑(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴)
−𝐾
−∞
                                  (1) 
 
where ROAA is the return on average assets; CAR is the share of equity capital in total asset and 
𝑑(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴) is the volatility of the mean return on average assets.   
 
According to De Nicolo (2000) this probability satisfies the following inequality: 
 
      𝑃[𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴 ≤ −𝐶𝐴𝑅] ≤
𝑑(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴)2
(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴+𝐶𝐴𝑅)2
=
1
𝑍2
                                                                       (2) 
 
Consequently, a rise of the Z-score corresponds to a reduced risk of insolvency. The value of the Z-score 
increases with a higher profitability and market capitalization and decreases with income volatility (see 
Boyd and Runkle, 1993; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2004; Beck et al., 2006; Mercieca et al., 2007; Lepetit 
et al., 2008; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Schaeck et al., 2009; Shih et al., 2007; and Fu et al., 2014). 
Theoretically, the Z-score permits a time-varying measure of bank stability that does not experience 
endogeneity issues. However, since 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴  and the standard deviation 𝑑(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴)  are mined from 
different distributions, this could generate an inconsistency issue. We differentiate our paper from the 
current literature by employing an alternative measure for bank stability that overcomes this problem 
and leads to more robust result. We have computed an alternative Z-score (𝑍𝑎𝑙𝑡) similar to Yeyati and 
Micco (2007) and Fiordelisi and Salvatore Mare (2014) which was computed as in equation (3): 
 
𝑧𝑎𝑙𝑡 =
𝜇(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴)+𝐶𝐴𝑅
𝑑(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴)
                                                                                                       (3) 
 
where, 𝜇(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴) is the mean of return on average assets within each financial institution in a country 
over a given period of time; ROAA is the return on average assets; CAR is the share of equity capital in 
total asset and 𝑑(𝑅𝑂𝐴𝐴) is the volatility of the mean return on average assets. We follow Laeven and 
Levine (2009) and Houston et al. (2010) who advocate the use of the natural log of the Z-score (lnZ) 
over the simple Z-score on the basis that the latter’s distribution is heavily skewed, whereas the former’s 
is not. As they state “the log of the Z-score in particular emerges from our refinement as an insolvency 
risk measure that is attractive and unproblematic to use (even as a dependent variable in standard 
regression analysis), providing more rigorously founded support to its emerging use in the literature.” 
 
Another strand of the literature has focused on various measures of bank stability such as 
financial strength ratings or on banks’ stock prices (for example, Bharath and Shumway, 2008; Nier, 
2005; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2006; Fiordelisi et al., 2011; Huang et al., 2012; Elliot et al., 2013; and 
López-Espinosa et al., 2013). Other researchers have examined the role of financial fragility, which is 
proxied by two different measures. One strand of the literature has used the financial stress indices (for 
example, Illing and Liu, 2006; Hakkio and Keeton, 2009; Misina and Tkacz, 2009; Hollo et al., 2012; 
and Park and Mercado, 2014). A different strand has focused on bankruptcy prediction by employing 
the probability of bankruptcy as an indicator of individual bank fragility, for example, Bharat and 
Shumway (2008) and Fu et al. (2014). In their paper, Fu et al. (2014) compute the probability of 
bankruptcy using the Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1974) contingent claims approaches and 
they conclude that the market-based measure of stability has more advantages than the accounting-based 
models which provide variable information depending on the firms’ accounting policies. For our second 
measure of bank stability we use the Financial system soundness index (FSSIij) was developed by Das 
et al. (2004) and measures the degree of soundness of a specific system as well as providing an ex ante 
measure of soundness. This index is composed of two main variables, the capital adequacy ratio plus the 
inverse of the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans both of which are weighted to reflect the 
country’s degree of financial intermediation. The index takes the following form: 
 
𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑗 =
𝑇𝐿𝑖
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖
[
1
2
(𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗 + 1/𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑗)]                                             (4) 
 
where 𝑇𝐿𝑖 is the total loans granted by financial institutions in country i; 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖 is the gross domestic 
product for a specific country i; 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑗 is the capital adequacy ratio for a financial institution j in country 
i; 𝑁𝑃𝐿𝑖𝑗  is the ratio of nonperforming loans of a financial institution j in country i. A higher FSSI 
indicates greater bank soundness and therefore greater bank stability. 
  
 Measurement of Economic Freedom 
For the purposes of the analysis that follows we use a set of control variables in our models as outlined 
in Table 1. To examine the role of economic freedom we have used the Heritage index which is 
commonly used in the literature and is composed of ten dimensions grouped into four pillars, of 
economic freedom: (i) Rule of Law (property rights, freedom from corruption); (ii) Limited Government 
(fiscal freedom, government spending); (iii) Regulatory Efficiency (business freedom, labour freedom, 
monetary freedom); and (iv) Open Markets (trade freedom, investment freedom, financial freedom). 
These 10 factors are equally weighted to create a composite index taking values from zero to 100, with 
a higher number indicating greater economic freedom. 
 
Measurement of Business Regulation 
To measure the impact of regulation in the economy as a whole, we have used two variables. The first 
regulation variable (REG1) is based on the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) which uses a 
scale of one to four, with one being no business regulation obstacles and four representing major 
obstacles that limit business entry, diminish competition and may also influence bank profitability and 
bank stability through spill-over effects. Regulatory obstacles to entry can result in a reduced level of 
competition by reducing new companies entering into a business (see for example, Ciccone and 
Papaioannou, 2007; Klapper et al., 2006; Pasiouras, 2008; Barth et al., 2009; Mamatzakis et al., 2013). 
Severe business regulations and an excessive amount of laws and regulations can also have harmful 
implications for the overall performance of companies and adversely affect debt service repayments to 
the banking sector. Secondly, we use the WBES availability of laws and regulations measure (REG2) 
which uses a scale of one to six to measure the degree of regulation with a low score representing a low 
level of regulatory development and a high score a higher level of regulation. 
 
Measurement of Corruption 
To measure corruption we use two variables, the corruption level of bank officials (CORR1) and a 
general value of corruption (CORR2). The corruption of bank officials can be measured either by the 
Corruption Perception Index developed by Transparency International (see for example, Barth et al., 
2009; Lalountas et al., 2011; and Weill, 2011a and 2011b) or by the indices developed by World 
Business Environment Survey (WBES). In our paper we choose the two indices developed by WBES 
due to the need to cover our entire sample. The first WBES index CORR1 measures the corruption of 
bank officials as an obstacle for the operation and growth of business and is used in Beck et al. (2006); 
Barth et al. (2009); Houston et al. (2011); Weill (2011a); Zheng et al. (2013). While the second WBES 
index CORR2 is a more generalised index of corruption for the country as a whole. A higher level of the 
corruption indices indicates a higher level of corruption. 
 Measurement of Transparency 
To measure transparency, we have computed a composite disclosure index (DISCL) using the 
methodology developed by Nier (2005). This index was calculated for each financial institution after 
extracting the necessary information from Bankscope and annual reports of the financial institutions.1  
The composite disclosure index measures the level of detail which banks provide on 17 dimensions of 
accounting information in their published accounts relating to both the asset and liability sides of a 
bank’s balance sheet, memorandum items, income statement and sources of funding. The disclosure 
index is normalized to take a value of between 0 and 1, with a higher value representing a higher level 
of disclosure. The implications of transparency on the banking market are ambiguous. If applied ex ante, 
disclosure may be beneficial for a financial institution with reference to the reduced likelihood of a crisis, 
a decreased likelihood of information contagion and a higher level of market discipline. However when 
applied ex post transparency can negatively impact upon bank profitability and bank stability. Table 1 
provides definitions and sources of all aforementioned variables used in our econometric analysis. 
[Table 1 approximately here] 
 
4. Econometric Modelling 
In this section we discuss the econometric approach developed to evaluate the impact of regulation, 
corruption and transparency on bank profitability and bank stability in Europe. The empirical work on 
the determinants of bank profitability and bank stability can theoretically suffer from an inconsistency 
problem, determined by omitted variables, an endogeneity bias or highly persistent revenues (see 
Poghosyan and Hesse, 2009; and Naceur and Omran, 2011). We used several estimation methods 
including the Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond (Blundell and Bond, 19982) 
but ultimately we settled on reporting the results from two-stage lest squares regression (2SLS). We 
preferred this technique, mainly because we found evidence that the dependent variable’s error terms 
were correlated with the independent variables3. After applying a series of tests for cross-sectional 
dependence, serial correlation, stationarity and heteroscedasticity, we have identified some potential 
problems with the heteroscedasticity test (Modified Wald test) mainly caused by measurement errors4. 
The two basic estimated models are defined as follows: 
 
                                                        
1 The methodology for constructing this index is analytically described in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
2 Build on the work of Arellano and Bover (1995) 
3 Furthermore, to make sure that our empirical analysis does not suffer from problematic multicollinearity, correlation 
matrices for all variables were calculated. Table A2 in the Appendix shows the correlation matrix for the case of Eurozone, 
which suggests no evidence of high correlations among the variables. Similar were the results for all other cases. Tables and 
results are not reported here for economy of space but are available from authors upon request. 
4 However, we should bear in mind that our data may suffer from a drawback, observing that when inferences are drawn from 
the Bankscope database, there can be an implicit selectivity bias (De Bandt and Davis, 1999; Corvoisier and Gropp, 2001). 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑘,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽0𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑘,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑘,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑘,𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡,      (5) 
 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑘,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽0𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑘,𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑘,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑅𝐸𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑘,𝑡
+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡,      (6) 
where 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑘,𝑡 is the profitability of the financial institution k in country i during the period t, and is 
measured in our study by three alternative measures (ROAA, ROAE and NIM); 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑘,𝑡 is the stability 
of the financial institution k in country i during the period t, and is measured in our analysis by the natural 
log of the Z-score and the financial system soundness index; 𝐸𝐹𝑖,𝑡  stands for Economic Freedom, 
expressed through the Fraser index, general business regulation REG and availability of laws and 
regulation represented by two variables REG1 and REG2; 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡 stands for corruption and is measured 
by two alternative indexes; corruption of bank officials CORR1 and general corruption CORR2; 𝐵𝑇𝑖𝑘,𝑡 
represents bank transparency for financial institution k in country i during the period t being represented 
by the disclosure index. 
 
We conduct an empirical analysis on the overall sample, but for reasons of robustness of the 
analysis we also break the sample to five different sub-samples by: 
  
(i) Region. The sample was divided in three main regions, namely the Eurozone (N=379 
financial institutions), the non-euro EU countries (N=181 financial institutions), and the EU 
candidate countries (N=121 financial institutions) 5. 
(ii) Size of a financial institution. This indicator was computed as the natural logarithm of total 
assets according to the last available year. We then took the maximum and minimum values 
of the logarithm of total assets (4.41 and 18.2) divided this into three equal intervals to obtain 
three groups, namely small institutions (N=178), medium institutions (N=326) and large 
institutions (N=177).  
(iii) Country income level. In this case, the countries were classified in two sub-categories using 
the World Bank definition, namely: high income countries (N=528 financial institutions) and 
upper middle income countries (N=153 financial institutions). 
(iv) Timing of entrance into the EU enlargement process. We had the following four groups: 
founding members including the first enlargement of UK, Ireland and Denmark (1957-73, 
                                                        
5 The countries selected are the Eurozone countries (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain), the non-euro EU 
countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania, Denmark and United Kingdom), and the 
EU candidate countries (Albania, Macedonia, Iceland, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey). Sweden was not included in the 
analysis due to data unavailability. 
N=270), EU enlargement group A (1981-95, N=91), and EU enlargement B (2004- 2014, 
N=199) and candidate countries i.e. those that had candidate status in 2014 (N=121).  
(v) Specialization of a financial institution. According to this, we classified the financial 
institutions in the following groups: commercial banks (N=423), cooperative banks (N=39), 
investment banks (N=34), real estate and mortgage banks (N=38), savings banks (N=55), and 
other financial institutions6 (N=92).7 
The idea behind the above categorization is that the European Banking sector is quite heterogeneous 
with banks operating in countries with different degrees of economic freedom, income levels, different 
banking models and banks themselves varying in size as measured by total assets. 
 
5. Summary statistics 
In Table 2 we report the summary statistics of the key variables used in our analysis for all the countries 
in the sample. Within our sample, the profitability indicators suggest that, on average, the profitability 
of the analyzed financial institutions is characterized by positive returns. The indicators of stability are 
represented by log Z-score and FSSI.  The economic Freedom indicator has a wide range from 43.5 in 
the case of Montenegro and Serbia in 2003, to 82.6 in the case of Ireland in 2007. The two regulation 
variables have similar means given that they use different scales. The level of corruption in the banking 
sector seems to be on average significantly lower than in the economy as a whole. Finally the disclosure 
variable is quite high giving a reading of 0.82 on a scale of 0 to 1. 
 
 [Table 2 approximately here] 
 
6. Results of the Panel Data Analysis 
The results of the empirical analysis are presented in Tables 3 to 8, for the overall sample, for the three 
different regions, for the size of the financial institutions, for high and middle income countries, for the 
timing of entrance into the EU enlargement process and for the specialization of the financial institution, 
respectively.  
 
The Relationship between Bank Profitability and Stability 
First, we concentrate on the results regarding the relationship between bank profitability and bank 
stability reported in Table 3. Models (1) to (5) use different dependent variables. More specifically, 
                                                        
6 Other financial institutions comprise bank holding and holding companies, clearing institutions, finance companies, Islamic 
banks, micro-financing institutions, private banking and asset management, specialized governmental credit and other credit 
institutions. 
7 For a detailed description of the various sub-samples and the countries that were included in each case see Table A3 in 
Appendix. 
models (1), (2) and (3) are estimated versions of equation (5) using for the Profik,t dependent variable 
three alternative proxies: ROAA, ROAE and NIM respectively. While models (4) and (5) are estimated 
versions of equation (6) that have as the dependent variable the stability of the banks (Stabik,t) using the 
natural log Z-score and the FSSI respectively. The results from models (1), (2) and (3) clearly indicate 
a positive relationship between bank profitability and bank stability using the lnZ-score regardless of 
looking at ROAA, ROE or NIM. There may be particular reasons for this result, as European Banks with 
less risk of bankruptcy were able to perform better during the period under consideration as they had 
access to cheaper capital and better quality loan books. Our results are in line with those reported in the 
literature showing that profitability ratios are important determinants of bank distress as discussed in 
Bongini et al. (2001). The results also extend to the FSSI measure of financial stability which shows a 
similar significant impact on ROAA, ROAE or NIM. On the other hand, regarding models (4) and (5) 
we also find that profitability as measured by the ROAE and NIM impact positively on bank stability as 
measured by the lnZ-score and FSSI measures. 
 
[Tables 3, 4 and 5 approximately here] 
 
 It is important to mention that we find similar results when we divided our sample into sub-
samples. Similar to Andrieș and Căpraru (2014), we have applied a regional differentiation criterion to 
our sample, although different from the one applied by the aforementioned researchers8. Table 4 shows 
the results of the same models for the three regional sub-samples: Eurozone, non-euro EU and EU 
candidate countries (including in our sample Croatia, which is a member of EU since July 2013). Bank 
stability has a significant positive role in the profitability of the banking sector in all three regions in all 
cases for models (1), (2) and (3) but the results are somewhat stronger for Eurozone and Non Eurozone 
countries than for the EU candidate countries (where the FSSI measure is deemed as non-significant). 
Also, we observe that the profitability indicators have a positive effect on the degree of bank stability 
for the Eurozone and for the non-euro EU countries depicted in models (4) and (5) as was observed for 
the overall sample. However, ROAA is significant only for the non-euro EU group; ROAE affects 
significantly all groups but only for the lnZ-score case; while NIM is non-significant for the Eurozone 
countries. 
  
Table 5 presents results regarding the size of a financial institution. For all categories of financial 
institutions (large, medium and small), the results reveal a significant positive impact of profitability 
indicators on bank stability (with the sole exemption of ROAA for the large sub-sample). Similar results 
are obtained concerning the influence of bank stability indicators on bank profitability (there is only one 
                                                        
8
 Andrieș and Căpraru (2014) investigated competition in the EU27 banking systems for the period 2004-2010, outlining the 
results for old members compared with new members, and also Eurozone compared to non-euro countries. 
negative non-significant coefficient for FSSI on ROAA for the large group). Finally, after dividing the 
sample into the other three cases: by country income, moment of entrance into the EU and specialization 
of the financial institution (see Tables 6, 7 and 8); our overall results seem to be very robust on all 
alternative cases suggesting a very strong positive relationship as it was expected from the theoretical 
predictions. 
 
The Role of Economic Freedom 
Regarding the economic freedom variable, the overall results in Table 3 suggest a significant negative 
impact on bank profitability as measured by ROAA and NIM but a significant positive impact on ROAE. 
When looking at Financial Stability we detect mixed results, since there is a significant negative impact 
on the risk of bankruptcy, but also a significant positive impact on financial stability as measured by the 
FSSI.  
When it comes to splitting the sample into Eurozone, EU non Euro and EU candidate countries 
in Table 4; the results suggests no impact of economic freedom to the Eurozone countries; negative 
impact for two cases of the EU non-Euro (for ROAA and NIM) but positive for ROAE; while for the 
EU candidates it is negative for ROAA and positive for NIM. The results for Financial Stability are less 
mixed. In general economic freedom is found to be strongly positive for all regional cases and for both 
specifications (ln-Z and FSSI) with the exemption of the Eurozone where for the ln Z-score it is found 
to be negative and significant. 
 
When we divide the sample between large, medium and small banks (see Table 5) we see a 
negative impact of economic freedom on bank profitability using ROAA for large banks (the other two 
cases are non-significant), a positive impact for medium size banks on ROAE but a negative impact on 
NIM; while for smaller banks we find no effect on profitability on any of the three measures. Thus, 
economic freedom seems to be non-significant for smaller banks but with a mixed effect for the other 
two cases. The impact of economic freedom on financial soundness is also mixed for large and medium 
size banks, since it is negative using lnZ for medium banks but positive using FSSI for both large and 
medium banks. Again for the small case no significant impact was detected. 
   
When we divide the sample into high income and upper middle income countries (see Table 6) 
we observe mixed results again. Economic freedom for high income countries has a negative impact 
when measuring profitability by ROAA and NIM and a positive impact when using ROAE. For upper 
middle income countries we detect a negative impact on ROAA and ROAE and a positive impact on 
NIM. Also, when we check the impact of economic freedom on the stability measures, for high income 
countries it is positive when using FSSI but negative when using lnZ; while we detect positive effects 
for both lnZ and FSSI for upper income countries. 
Table 7 divides the EU by founding members, Enlargement A and B. The results for Economic 
Freedom on profitability are positive for the ROAE but negative for NIM for the founding members; 
negative for NIM for the enlargement group A and positive for both ROAE and NIM for enlargement 
group B. The results for economic freedom on stability for the founding members are negative using lnZ 
but positive using FSSI for both the founding members and enlargement group B but the reverse is true 
for enlargement group A. This suggests very mixed results for the impact on economic freedom for both 
profitability and stability in the European area. 
 
Finally, the results reported in Table 8 are again quite mixed. For commercial banks it is negative 
for ROAE and NIM but positive for ROAA; for cooperative banks it is positive using ROAA and ROAE 
but negative using NIM; while for investment banks we have positive effects for ROAE and NIM only. 
For real estate banks we have a negative effect on ROAA and for savings banks a positive effect for 
ROAE but a negative effect for NIM. Finally for other banks we detect a negative effect on both ROAA 
and NIM. In terms of the impact on financial stability Economic freedom has a negative impact on lnZ 
and a positive effect on FSSI for commercial banks, a negative impact on FSSI for investment banks, 
and a positive impact for both lnZ and FSSI for savings and other banks. 
 
The Role of Regulation 
When it comes to the impact of regulation we generally detect a strong negative impact of regulation on 
profitability from both the REG1 and REG2 variables, there is however one exception and that is when 
we use ROAE where the REG1 has a significant positive impact. Overall, our results are in line with 
those obtained by Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) showing that higher levels of regulation impose 
higher expenses on financial institutions and/or limit revenues raising activities. In addition, an effective 
regulatory framework may also reduce the risk premia on bank lending which can negatively affect bank 
profitability. The impact of regulation on financial stability is positive using the lnZ-score but negative 
using the FSSI coefficient in the overall sample showing the importance of different definitions of 
stability. 
 
The negative results of regulation on profitability (as shown in Table 4) are particularly strong 
in the case of the Eurozone economies but mixed results are obtained in the case of the non euro EU and 
EU candidate countries. For the EU non-Euro group REG1 is significant and negative for ROAE, 
significant and positive for NIM and non-sginificat for ROAA; while  REG2 two has a significant 
positive effect for the two first measures (ROAA, ROAE) but significant negative effect for NIM. For 
the EU candidate countries we detect a positive impact from REG1 on ROAA but a negative impact on 
NIM and REG2 is now non-significant for all cases. When it comes to stability for the Eurozone we 
have a positive impact from both REG1 and REG2 using the lnZ-score but a negative impact using FSSI. 
For the non Eurozone group countries we obtain non-significant effects of both REG1 and REG2 on 
lnZ, while for FSSI it is significant and positive for the case of REG1 and significant but negative for 
the case of REG2. Finally, for the EU candidate countries we detect a positive impact of REG1 on both 
lnZ and FSSI while REG2 appears to be non-significant.  
  
Regulation has mixed effects on profitability when we examine at institutions by size in Table 5. 
We observe a negative impact on NIM using both REG1 and REG2 though we detect a positive impact 
on ROAA and ROAE from the REG2 variable for large institutions. For medium size institutions REG1 
has a positive impact on ROAE and negative for NIM; while REG2 is non-significant for all three 
profitability definitions. For smaller banks the REG2 definition has a negative impact on all three 
measures of profitability; and REG1 is significant and negative only for NIM. When it comes to stability 
there are some differences, for large banks REG1 has a positive impact on FSSI, while for medium and 
small banks the impact is negative. The REG2 variable also has a significant negative impact on FSSI 
for medium and small banks but no effect is detected for larger banks. However for the lnZ measure of 
stability we detect a positive impact for small banks only.  
 
When it comes to high income level countries the results are again mixed as depicted in Table 6. 
For the high-income group, using the REG1 variable there is a significant negative impact on both 
ROAA and NIM but a positive effect on ROAE. While using the REG 2 variable gives a negative impact 
on all three measures of profitability. This contrasts somewhat with the results from middle income 
countries where regulation using REG1 seems to have a significant positive effect on profitability as 
measured by ROAA and ROAE and positive effect on all three measures of profitability for REG2. With 
regards to stability, REG1 and REG2 are significant positive for the lnZ-score but significant and 
negative for FSSI and for high-income countries; while for the middle-income ones REG1 is positive 
and REG2 is negative only for the FSSI case (the effect on NIM is totally non-significant).  
 
Additionally, regulation seems to negatively impact profitability for REG2 in the case of the 
founding members of the EU in Table 7 with less clear results for the Enlargement groups A and B.  For 
EU enlargement group A we find a positive impact from REG1 on ROAA and ROAE but a negative 
impact on these two measures of profitability using REG2.  However for Enlargement group B for REG2 
we find a positive impact on ROAA and ROAE showing that regulation may or may not undermine bank 
profitability. Regulation seems to have no impact on financial stability for either the founding members 
or enlargement groups A and B. 
 
When it comes to bank specialization (Table 8) we again see mixed results concerning the impact 
on profitability. For commercial banks there is negative impact of REG1 on ROAA and NIM but a 
positive impact on ROAE. We also see that REG1 impacts positively on ROAA and ROAE for 
cooperative banks but REG2 has a negative impact on ROAA and NIM for investment banks. We also 
detect negative impacts of regulation on profitability using REG1 on NIM other financial institutions 
but a positive effect on ROAE for savings institutions (all other cases are non-significant), while REG2 
has a negative impact on NIM for real estate and mortgage banks and on ROAE for other financial 
institutions (all other cases are non-significant). When it comes to financial stability we find REG1 has 
a significant negative impact on lnZ only for commercial banks, while a negative impact was registered 
for FSSI when considering commercial, real estate and mortgage and other banks. The REG2 variable 
definition has a negative effect on FSSI for commercial and cooperative banks but a positive impact on 
FSSI for investment banks and on lnZ for other banks.  
  
[Tables 6, 7 and 8 approximately here] 
 
The Role of Corruption 
Corruption exists in varying degrees in every country worldwide and it is generally regarded as having 
adverse effects on an economy and the profitability and stability of the banking sector. However, the 
academic literature suggests that corruption can actually raise bank profitability and soundness. When 
we check the overall sample (see Table 3) we can see that the results on corruption on ROAE are negative 
for general corruption (CORR1) and corruption of bank officials (CORR2) but positive on NIM using 
the CORR2 variable. We also detect a negative impact on lnZ for CORR1 but a positive effect on lnZ 
for CORR2 making it hard to conclude how corruption affects banking sector stability. 
 
When looking at the results by region in Table 4 we can see that CORR1 has a negative impact 
on ROAE for the Eurozone area, non Euro EU and EU candidate countries but a positive impact on 
ROAA for the non Eurozone EU countries, and for NIM for the EU candidates. In terms of stability the 
CORR1 has a negative impact on lnZ for the Eurozone but a positive impact on FSSI for EU candidate 
countries; while CORR2 has a positive impact on lnZ for the Eurozone countries and negative for the 
EU candidate countries. For the non Eurozone group there is no discernible impact stemming from 
neither of the two corruption variable definitions. 
   When we look at bank size in Table 5 we find the CORR1 has a negative impact on ROAE for 
large and medium size banks but a positive effect on ROAA for large banks. The CORR2 produces 
mixed results having a positive impact on NIM for large and medium size banks but a negative effect in 
the case of small banks. When it comes to financial stability we find very mixed results as well with 
CORR1 having a negative impact on lnZ for large, medium and small banks, while a positive impact of 
CORR2 on lnZ was observed for large banks. Though, we have obtained a negative impact of CORR2 
on FSSI for large and small banks. 
In Table 6 we observe that the influence of CORR1 is negative for all three alternative measures 
of profitability for upper income countries with no discernible effects for upper middle income countries. 
CORR2 is negative for ROAE but positive for NIM in high income countries; while it is consistently 
negative for ROAA and ROAE for the upper middle income countries. When it comes to financial 
stability we get a negative effect of CORR1 on lnZ but a positive effect from CORR2 and a positive 
effect of CORR1 on FSSI for the high income countries; while neither of the corruption variables seem 
to play a role on the stability of upper middle income countries. 
 
In Table7 we detect a strong negative impact of corruption as measured by CORR1 in founding 
members on NIM, while for Enlargement group B, apart from NIM a negative impact was also observed 
for ROAE. However, when we use the CORR2 we find a positive effect for the founding members on 
ROAE and mixed results for Enlargement group B with a negative effect on ROAE but a positive effect 
on NIM. The effects of corruption on stability are mixed with CORR1 having a negative effect on lnZ 
for the founding members but when it comes to enlargement group B we find CORR2 has a positive 
effect on lnZ but a negative effect on FSSI. 
 
When we look at the impact of corruption by bank type in Table 8 we find a negative impact of 
CORR1 on ROAE for commercial banks; for ROAA and NIM for cooperative banks and for RAA for 
savings banks (all other effects are non-significant). However, the effect of CORR2 is negative only for 
the case of ROAE of commercial banks and positive for NIM of commercial banks; ROAA and NIM of 
cooperative banks and others; NIM of real estate and mortgage, and savings banks. When it comes to 
financial stability CORR1 has a negative impact on lnZ for commercial and real estate and mortgage 
banks, while a positive impact was observed for cooperative banks using the same profitability measure. 
Moreover, CORR2 has a positive impact on lnZ for commercial banks, while for real estate and mortgage 
banks the positive impact was observe for FSSI using the same corruption indicator. 
 
Our mixed results for the impact of corruption contrast with those obtained by Aburime (2008) 
who shows that an increase in the corruption index implies a decrease in bank profitability for the 
Nigerian banking market. Likewise, Pagano (2008) finds that corruption is a significant determining 
factor in evaluating bank lending rates and that at relatively low levels of corruption an increase in 
corruption leads to a fall in lending rates which decreases bank profitability. However, at high levels of 
corruption an increase in corruption can actually raise lending rates. 
  
The Role of Transparency 
The last issue we discuss refers to the importance of transparency in the banking sector, and its impact 
on bank profitability and banks. The overall results in Table 3 clearly show that transparency as 
measured by DISCL has a negative impact on profitability using all three measures. This negative impact 
is surprisingly robust across all the tables. There are a few exceptions where DISCL has a positive 
impact: (i) first, on ROAE for EU candidate countries; (ii) second on ROAE for cooperative banks and 
on ROAA for real estate and mortgage banks. With reference to stability the results suggest that 
disclosure has a strongly positive impact upon stability using both the lnZ and FSSI measures.  The only 
instances of negative effects on financial stability are in the case of EU candidate countries, small banks 
and cooperative banks when measuring bank stability by lnZ coefficient. 
 
Thus, the obtained results overall support the hypothesis that disclosure and information sharing 
can help reduce adverse selection and moral hazard and can thereby reduce default rates. Financial 
institutions are often unable to notice the particularities of each borrower which raises the adverse 
selection issues; therefore there is an inability to control general risks, such as the behaviour of the 
borrower after receiving a loan. In our analysis, the empirical results suggest that there is an overall 
negative relationship between bank disclosure and bank profitability and a positive impact on financial 
stability. 
  
7. Conclusions 
The role of the banking sector in the events of recent years shows the importance looking at how banks 
are affected by the degree of economic freedom, a sound regulatory framework, reducing corruption and 
increasing transparency in helping to ensure a return to profitability and stability. The purpose of this 
paper has been to provide some empirical evidence on how these variables impact upon bank 
performance and bank stability. Overall, our results clearly indicate that there is a clear trade-off between 
increasing financial stability and bank profitability. However the impact of increasing economic 
freedom, increasing regulation, reducing corruption and increasing transparency is less clear-cut and 
more nuanced at the empirical level. In general, greater economic freedom can decrease or increase 
profitability or stability depending on the measure used. Increased regulation appears to have a 
detrimental impact on bank profitability and a tendency to reduce the risk of bankruptcy. There was less 
evidence at the aggregate level that reducing corruption improved bank profitability and no evidence 
that it increased bank stability. We did, however, detect evidence at the aggregate level that increased 
disclosure adversely affected bank profitability and surprisingly seems to increase the risk of bankruptcy. 
 
 The main contribution of this paper has been to show that conclusions obtained using aggregate 
data do not necessarily hold when the data is disaggregated. We find that results at the aggregate level 
can hide significant and even contradictory results once the data is disaggregated. In the case of greater 
economic freedom we find that it adversely affects financial stability in middle income countries but is 
good for financial stability in low income countries. We find that for large financial institutions there is 
some evidence to suggest that greater regulation can improve financial stability but this is not necessarily 
the case for medium and small size institutions. Corruption is more of a problem for small and medium 
size institutions than for larger ones. For the Eurozone plus countries, the results show that excessive 
regulation can adversely affect the profitability indicators of the financial sector and that there may be 
significant gains in increasing financial disclosure rather than in increasing regulation.  
 
 In response to the financial crisis and the Eurozone crisis, Europe has begun a process of 
improving the regulation and supervision of European financial institutions. For example, in December 
2010 the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) was created as an independent body of the EU with 
responsibility for macro-prudential supervision of the financial system, and for preventing or reducing 
risks in the EU financial sector. In addition, in 2011 the European System of Financial Supervision 
(ESFS) was created, as a decentralized and multilayer group of micro and macro-prudential 
organizations, with its main objective being to ensure a harmonized and consistent supervision and 
regulatory framework in the EU. Our results suggest that the impact of changes in the regulatory and 
supervisory framework and the greater degree of harmonization of regulations can have significantly 
differential impacts on the Eurozone plus and enlargement groups A and B. These differential effects on 
bank profitability and bank stability mean that the harmonization of regulation and supervision needs to 
be done in a way that recognizes the differential impact. In addition, when stress testing banks across 
the EU prospective changes in the regulatory environment need to borne in mind, especially as they 
impact large, medium and smaller size banks in different ways. 
 
Finally, we should note that our analysis has some limitations. The European banking industry 
has been developing rapidly in the last 15 years in a continuously changing regulatory and economic 
environment. As such, our results capture a key period in which there was a massive expansion of the 
sector followed by a major crisis and a prolonged period of dealing with that crisis. Results in the future 
might be very different should the sector stabilize and bank operations move away from some of the 
riskier operations of the past. There may also be risks to the financial system as a whole if greater 
regulation of the banking sector shift activities to the less regulated shadow banking sector. 
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TABLES 
Table 1: Variable definition and sources 
Variables Definition Data sources 
Bank 
performance  
Return on 
average assets  
(ROAA) 
Net income divided by average total assets  Bankscope 
Annual 
Reports 
Return on 
average equity  
(ROAE) 
Net income divided by average total equity Bankscope 
Annual 
Reports 
Net interest 
margin (NIM) 
The difference between the interest income produced by banks or other financial institutions, and the volume of 
interest paid out to their lenders relative to the volume of their assets 
Bankscope 
Annual 
Reports 
Bank 
soundness 
Z score (Z) (Equity/Assets + ROAA)/ Volatility of ROAA  Authors 
calculations 
Alternative Z 
score  
(Zalt) 
The sum of capital adequacy ratio and average return on asset ratio, over the dispersion of the return on asset ratio. Authors 
calculations  
Financial 
System 
Soundness 
Index 
(FSSI) 
This index is assessing the degree of soundness of a given system, and provides an ex ante measure of soundness. The 
index is composed of 2 variables: capital adequacy ratio and the inversed ratio of NPLs, weighted by the 
intermediation ratio. It was computed using the methodology of Das et al (2004). 
Authors 
calculations 
Economic 
freedom 
 
Regulation 
Economic 
Freedom 
(EF) 
The heritage index of economic freedom an index from 0 to 100 measuring economic freedom based on 10 
dimensions, with higher number corresponding to greater economic freedom. 
Heritage 
Business 
Regulation 
(REG1) 
The degree to which business regulation represents and obstacle to the overall economic activity(1-no obstacle, 2-
minor obstacle, 3- a moderate obstacle, 4-major obstacle) 
WBES 
Availability of 
regulation 
(REG2) 
Availability of laws and regulation. It takes values from 1 to 6, from a reduced level of laws to a developed level of laws 
and regulation 
WBES 
Corruption  
 
 
 
 
  
Corruption 
(CORR1) 
Corruption of bank officials as an obstacle for the operation and growth of the business (1-no obstacle, 2-minor 
obstacle, 3- a moderate obstacle, 4-major obstacle) 
WBES 
General 
constraint-
corruption 
(CORR2) 
Represents the overall value of corruption, and it takes values form 1 to 4 (1-no obstacle, 2-minor obstacle, 3- a 
moderate obstacle, 4-major obstacle) 
WBES 
Transparency Disclosure 
index 
(DISCL) 
Measures the level of detail which banks provide on 17 dimension of accounting information in their public accounts. 
For each sub-index, a 0 was assigned if there was no entry in any of the corresponding categories and a 1 otherwise.  
The variables were computed using the methodology of Nier (2005) as explained in Nier Table 1, Appendix. 
Authors 
calculations 
Note: WBES stands for World Business Environment Survey (2000), WDI stands for World Development Indicator. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics   
Variable Obs. Mean Min Max 
ROAE 6093 4.88 
(9.69) 
-87.59 84.97 
ROAA 6096 0.62 
(2.74) 
-43.68 36.00 
NIM 6094 3.23 
(3.05) 
-3.01 50.88 
Z 6204 19.27 
(22.16) 
-9.66 243.15 
Z alt 6204 19.27 
(22.11) 
-10.66 241.92 
FSSI 6197 0.24 
(0.94) 
-13.86 30.17 
EF 8564 66.37 
(7.43) 
43.50 82.60 
REG1 3900 2.08 
(1.15) 
1.00 4.00 
REG2 3922 3.09 
(1.47) 
1.00 6.00 
CORR1 3922 1.58 
(1.01) 
1.00 4.00 
CORR2 3922 2.17 
(1.15) 
1.00 4.00 
DISCL 6098 0.82 
(0.16) 
0.00 1.00 
Note: Obs. stands for the number of observations; in parentheses we have standard errors. 
Source: Authors calculations. 
 
  
Table 3: Empirical results for the entire sample (2SLS) 
 
 
 
 
Variables  Model specification 
 
(1) 
ROAA 
(2) 
ROAE 
(3) 
NIM 
 
(4) 
ln Z 
 
(5) 
FSSI 
ROAA               0.04# 
(0.01) 
ROAE                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
 
0.03# 
(0.01)  
0.01
(0.01) 
NIM             0.03# 
(0.01) 
 
 
0.03# 
(0.01) 
LNZ  0.48# 
(0.05) 
   2.01# 
(0.15) 
  0.24# 
(0.04) 
      
FSSI  
 
0.41# 
(0.08) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.82# 
(0.67) 
 
 
 
 
0.74# 
(0.14) 
 
 
 
 
    
EF  
 
-0.03# 
(0.01) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.13# 
(0.02) 
 
 
 
 
-0.06# 
(0.01) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.04# 
(0.01) 
 
 
0.03# 
(0.01) 
REG1  
 
-0.09# 
(0.03) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.48# 
(0.12) 
 
 
 
 
-0.32# 
(0.04) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.08# 
(0.01) 
 
 
-0.02# 
(0.01) 
REG2  
 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.17* 
(0.08) 
 
 
 
 
-0.14# 
(0.03) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.04# 
(0.01) 
 
 
-0.03# 
(0.01) 
CORR1  
 
0.03 
(0.04) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.61# 
(0.12) 
 
 
 
 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.06# 
(0.02) 
 
 
0.01 
(0.01) 
CORR2  
 
0.04 
(0.03) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-0.65# 
(0.12) 
 
 
 
 
0.53# 
(0.05) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.03* 
(0.02) 
 
 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
DISCL  
 
-0.88# 
(0.19) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-1.64# 
(0.69) 
 
 
 
 
-1.39# 
(0.37) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.94# 
(0.14) 
 
 
0.29# 
(0.02) 
C  
 
1.52# 
(0.41) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-5.70# 
(1.44) 
  
 
7.37# 
(0.53) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.98# 
(0.20) 
 
 
-0.48# 
(0.07) 
R sq  0.09    0.10   0.11    0.10  0.05 
F test/Wald Chi2  
 
203.38 
(0.00) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
772.89 
(0.00) 
 
 
 
 
556.73 
(0.00) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
295.74 
(0.00) 
 
 
242.91 
(0.00) 
Obs.  3893    3891   3892    3895  3892 
Note: Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression; * denotes statistical significance at 5% and # denotes statistical significance at 1%. Values of standard errors in parentheses.  
Source: Authors calculations 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4: Empirical results by region (2SLS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression* denotes statistical significance at 5% and # denotes statistical significance at 1%. Values of standard errors in parentheses.  
Source: Authors calculations 
  
 Model specification 
 EUROZONE EU NON-EURO EU CANDIDATE 
Variable 
(1) 
ROAA 
(2) 
ROAE 
(3) 
NIM 
 
(4) 
ln Z 
(5) 
FSSI 
(1) 
ROAA 
(2) 
ROAE 
(3) 
NIM 
 
(4) 
ln Z 
(5) 
FSSI 
(1) 
ROAA 
(2) 
ROAE 
(3) 
NIM 
 
(4) 
ln Z 
(5) 
FSSI 
ROAA      0.01 
(0.01) 
     0.03# 
(0.01) 
     0.01 
(0.01) 
ROAE     
 
0.02# 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
    
 
0.04# 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
    
 
0.13# 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
NIM     
 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
    
 
0.04# 
(0.01) 
0.03# 
(0.01) 
    
 
0.09# 
(0.01) 
0.03# 
(0.01) 
LNZ 0.33# 
(0.04) 
1.82# 
(0.23) 
0.10# 
(0.03) 
   0.58# 
(0.07) 
1.89# 
(0.28) 
0.28# 
(0.08) 
   1.12# 
(0.32) 
1.84# 
(0.18) 
1.39# 
(0.19) 
   
FSSI 0.28# 
(0.08) 
1.81* 
(0.83) 
0.27# 
(0.08) 
   0.94# 
(0.15) 
0.55 
(0.72) 
3.16# 
(0.35) 
   -0.18 
(0.43) 
0.26 
(0.47) 
1.18 
(0.73) 
   
EF 0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
 
 
-0.06# 
(0.01) 
0.03# 
(0.01) 
-0.03# 
(0.01) 
0.17# 
(0.02) 
-0.08# 
(0.01) 
 
 
0.03# 
(0.01) 
0.04# 
(0.01) 
-0.11* 
(0.05) 
-0.07 
(004) 
0.16# 
(0.04) 
 
 
0.03# 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
REG1 -0.06* 
(0.03) 
0.06 
(0.18) 
-0.18# 
(0.03) 
 
 
0.06# 
(0.02) 
-0.06# 
(0.01) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.64# 
(0.16) 
0.26# 
(0.10) 
 
 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.01* 
(0.01) 
0.52# 
(0.18) 
0.21 
(0.18) 
-0.74# 
(0.20) 
 
 
0.11* 
(0.06) 
0.07# 
(0.03) 
REG2 -0.08# 
(0.03) 
-1.07# 
(0.16) 
-0.05 
(0.03) 
 
 
0.06# 
(0.02) 
-0.03# 
(0.01) 
0.12# 
(0.04) 
0.54# 
(0.08) 
-0.18# 
(0.06) 
 
 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.01* 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.08) 
-0.02 
(0.09) 
-0.06 
(0.12) 
 
 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
CORR1 -0.07 
(0.04) 
-0.85# 
(0.28) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
 
 
-0.12# 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.18# 
(0.05) 
-0.36# 
(0.09) 
-0.01 
(0.11) 
 
 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.14 
(0.19) 
-0.44# 
(0.14) 
0.46# 
(0.16) 
 
 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
0.06# 
(0.02) 
CORR2 -0.01 
(0.04) 
0.44 
(0.27) 
-0.09 
(0.05) 
 
 
0.15# 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.07 
(0.12) 
0.39# 
(0.10) 
 
 
0.05 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.43# 
(0.14) 
-0.31 
(0.19) 
0.25 
(0.17) 
 
 
-0.10* 
(0.05) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
DISCL -0.78* 
(0.40) 
-4.71 
(2.73) 
-2.20# 
(0.59) 
 
 
0.99# 
(0.31) 
0.61# 
(0.09) 
-1.26# 
(0.23) 
-3.05# 
(0.75) 
-1.29# 
(0.43) 
 
 
1.05# 
(0.16) 
0.21# 
(0.02) 
1.40 
(0.78) 
2.34# 
(0.72) 
1.26 
(1.15) 
 
 
-0.67# 
(0.24) 
0.15# 
(0.05) 
C 0.50 
(0.52) 
8.95* 
(4.22) 
6.16# 
(0.76) 
 
 
4.91# 
(0.40) 
-1.12# 
(0.27) 
1.41# 
(0.50) 
-10.57# 
(1.17) 
8.92# 
(0.75) 
 
 
1.19# 
(0.24) 
-0.30# 
(0.05) 
5.02 
(3.85) 
1.39 
(2.07) 
-9.89# 
(2.86) 
 
 
0.54 
(0.83) 
-1.14# 
(0.30) 
R.sq 0.07 0.08 0.04  0.12 0.08 0.13 0.17 0.13  0.14 0.11 0.23 0.34 0.29   0.17 
Wald χ2 77.12 
(0.00) 
177.43 
(0.00) 
101.88 
(0.00) 
 
 
234.45 
(0.00) 
95.27 
(0.00) 
153.03 
(0.00) 
359.94 
(0.00) 
441.24 
(0.00) 
 
 
139.14 
(0.00) 
196.47 
(0.00) 
51.48 
(0.00) 
148.65 
(0.00) 
158.60 
(0.00) 
 
 
176.18 
(0.00) 
48.24 
(0.00) 
Obs. 1999 1998 1999  2000 1999 1533 1532 1532  1534 1532 361 361 361  361 361 
Table 5: Empirical results by financial institutions’ size (2SLS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression; * denotes statistical significance at 5% and # denotes statistical significance at 1%. Values of standard errors in parentheses.  
Source: Authors calculations 
  
  
 LARGE  MEDIUM SMALL 
Variable (1) 
ROAA 
(2) 
ROAE 
(3) 
NIM 
 
(4) 
ln Z 
(5) 
FSSI 
(1) 
ROAA 
(2) 
ROAE 
(3) 
NIM 
 
(4) 
ln Z 
(5) 
FSSI 
(1) 
ROAA 
(2) 
ROAE 
(3) 
NIM 
 
(4) 
ln Z 
(5) 
FSSI 
ROAA      -0.01 
(0.01) 
     0.01 
(0.01) 
     0.04# 
(0.01) 
ROAE     
 
0.06# 
(0.01) 
0.03# 
(0.01) 
    
 
0.03# 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
    
 
0.01# 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
NIM     
 
0.04# 
(0.01) 
0.04# 
(0.01) 
    
 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
    
 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
LNZ 0.69# 
(0.12) 
2.03# 
(0.27) 
0.71# 
(0.10) 
   0.43# 
(0.05) 
2.17# 
(0.23) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
   0.44# 
(0.09) 
1.45# 
(0.37) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
   
FSSI -0.03 
(0.11) 
2.46# 
(0.53) 
0.69* 
(0.30) 
   0.30# 
(0.09) 
2.43# 
(1.00) 
0.26# 
(0.09) 
   1.06# 
(0.25) 
4.04* 
(1.83) 
0.93# 
(0.29) 
   
EF -0.05# 
(0.01) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
 
 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.03# 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.22# 
(0.03) 
-0.10# 
(0.01) 
 
 
-0.04# 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.07) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
 
 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
REG1 -0.01 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.16) 
-0.27# 
(0.10) 
 
 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.04# 
(0.01) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
0.48# 
(0.17) 
-0.33# 
(0.05) 
 
 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.04# 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
0.18 
(0.26) 
-0.10* 
(0.04) 
 
 
0.11# 
(0.03) 
-0.03# 
(0.01) 
REG2 0.09# 
(0.03) 
0.32# 
(0.09) 
-0.14* 
(0.06) 
 
 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.22 
(0.15) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
 
 
0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.03# 
(0.01) 
-0.14# 
(0.04) 
-1.33# 
(0.25) 
-0.11# 
(0.04) 
 
 
0.15# 
(0.03) 
-0.04# 
(0.01) 
CORR1 0.16# 
(0.05) 
-0.26# 
(0.10) 
-0.08 
(0.09) 
 
 
-0.05* 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.72# 
(0.26) 
0.21* 
(0.09) 
 
 
-0.07* 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.03 
(0.08) 
-0.52 
(0.45) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
 
 
-0.12* 
(0.06) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
CORR2 -0.07 
(0.04) 
-0.23 
(0.12) 
0.39# 
(0.10) 
 
 
0.07# 
(0.02) 
-0.02# 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.41 
(0.24) 
0.46# 
(0.08) 
 
 
0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.07) 
0.30 
(0.42) 
-0.18* 
(0.10) 
 
 
0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.03# 
(0.01) 
DISCL -0.98# 
(0.26) 
-2.69# 
(0.60) 
-1.03 
(0.57) 
 
 
1.07# 
(0.18) 
0.27# 
(0.02) 
-0.42 
(0.32) 
0.73 
(1.42) 
-1.71# 
(0.42) 
 
 
0.92# 
(0.22) 
0.30# 
(0.04) 
-1.41* 
(0.62) 
-16.42# 
(4.55) 
-2.80# 
(1.06) 
 
 
-0.89* 
(0.40) 
0.33# 
(0.09) 
C 2.82# 
(0.64) 
-4.11* 
(1.96) 
3.99# 
(0.95) 
 
 
1.11# 
(0.29) 
-0.57# 
(0.08) 
-0.48 
(0.68) 
-13.64# 
(2.22) 
9.81# 
(0.74) 
 
 
3.04# 
(0.31) 
-0.33* 
(0.16) 
1.36* 
(0.64) 
21.85# 
(5.35) 
5.30# 
(0.85) 
 
 
3.42# 
(0.52) 
-0.15 
(0.14) 
                   
R.sq 0.13 0.18 0.06  0.23 0.14 0.07 0.13 0.23  0.09 0.05 0.10 0.08 0.05  0.09 0.11 
Wald Chi2 132.60 
(0.00) 
231.65 
(0.00) 
92.37 
(0.00) 
 
 
196.08 
(0.00) 
268.24 
(0.00) 
82.53 
(0.00) 
427.76 
(0.00) 
371.31 
(0.00) 
 
 
129.84 
(0.00) 
79.45 
(0.00) 
48.91 
(0.00) 
104.19 
(0.00) 
48.14 
(0.00) 
 
 
79.85 
(0.00) 
48.23 
(0.00) 
Obs. 1365 1364 1364  1366 1364 1531 1531 1531  1532 1531 997 996 997  997 997 
Table 6 
Empirical results by country income level (2SLS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression; * denotes statistical significance at 5% and # denotes statistical significance at 1%. Values of standard errors in parentheses.  
Source: Authors calculations 
  
 Model specification 
Variable HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES UPPER MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES 
 (1) 
ROAA 
(2) 
ROAE 
(3) 
NIM 
 
(4) 
ln Z 
(5) 
FSSI 
(1) 
ROAA 
(2) 
ROAE 
(3) 
NIM 
 
(4) 
ln Z 
(5) 
FSSI 
ROAA      0.03# 
(0.01) 
     0.01* 
(0.01) 
ROAE     
 
0.03# 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
    
 
0.18# 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
NIM     
 
0.01* 
(0.01) 
0.03# 
(0.01) 
    
 
0.04# 
(0.01) 
0.03# 
(0.01) 
LNZ 0.38# 
(0.04) 
2.08# 
(0.20) 
0.11# 
(0.05) 
   0.94# 
(0.15) 
1.25# 
(0.11) 
0.59# 
(0.10) 
   
FSSI 0.34# 
(0.08) 
1.93# 
(0.74) 
0.46# 
(0.10) 
   0.43* 
(0.22) 
0.50 
(0.27) 
2.86# 
(0.56) 
   
EF -0.04# 
(0.01) 
0.16# 
(0.03) 
-0.07# 
(0.01) 
 
 
-0.03# 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.03* 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
0.07# 
(0.01) 
 
 
0.03# 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
REG1 -0.10# 
(0.02) 
0.40# 
(0.15) 
-0.31# 
(0.04) 
 
 
0.06# 
(0.02) 
-0.04# 
(0.01) 
0.27# 
(0.08) 
0.28# 
(0.08) 
-0.17 
(0.10) 
 
 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
0.02# 
(0.01) 
REG2 -0.04* 
(0.02) 
-0.48# 
(0.12) 
-0.14# 
(0.04) 
 
 
0.05# 
(0.01) 
-0.03# 
(0.01) 
0.10* 
(0.05) 
0.15# 
(0.05) 
0.18# 
(0.07) 
 
 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
CORR1 -0.12# 
(0.04) 
-0.38* 
(0.19) 
-0.22# 
(0.08) 
 
 
-0.08# 
(0.02) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.09 
(0.07) 
-0.12 
(0.07) 
0.02 
(0.08) 
 
 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
CORR2 0.06 
(0.03) 
-0.47# 
(0.16) 
0.56# 
(0.07) 
 
 
0.06# 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.33# 
(0.08) 
-0.25# 
(0.09) 
-0.20 
(0.11) 
 
 
0.06 
(003) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
DISCL -0.91# 
(0.23) 
-1.43 
(0.98) 
-1.65# 
(0.45) 
 
 
1.13# 
(0.15) 
0.33# 
(0.03) 
-0.80* 
(0.41) 
-0.88* 
(0.40) 
-0.84 
(0.50) 
 
 
0.57* 
(0.29) 
0.22# 
(0.04) 
C 1.39# 
(0.34) 
-6.46# 
(1.89) 
9.22# 
(0.67) 
 
 
2.86# 
(0.23) 
-0.42# 
(0.10) 
1.55 
(1.11) 
0.64 
(0.72) 
-0.58 
(0.87) 
 
 
0.10 
(0.38) 
-0.39# 
(0.07) 
R.sq 0.09 0.07 0.12  0.10 0.05 0.16 0.26 0.15  0.29 0.14 
F test/Wald χ2 157.68 
(0.00) 
357.54 
(0.00) 
445.19 
(0.00) 
 
 
242.01 
(0.00) 
207.01 
(0.00) 
77.11 
(0.00) 
194.69 
(0.00) 
181.76 
(0.00) 
 
 
176.98 
(0.00) 
105.41 
(0.00) 
Obs. 2967 2965 2966  2969 2966 926 926 926  926 926 
 
Table 7: Empirical results by timing of entrance into the EU (2SLS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression; * denotes statistical significance at 5% and # denotes statistical significance at 1%. Values of standard errors in parentheses.  
Source: Authors calculations 
 
 
 
Model specification 
 
 
FOUNDING MEMBERS  EU ENLARGEMENT – A EU ENLARGEMENT – B 
Variable (1) 
ROAA 
(2) 
ROAE 
(3) 
NIM 
 
(4) 
ln Z 
(5) 
FSSI 
(1) 
ROAA 
(2) 
ROAE 
(3) 
NIM 
 
(4) 
ln Z 
(5) 
FSSI 
(1) 
ROAA 
(2) 
ROAE 
(3) 
NIM 
 
(4) 
ln Z 
(5) 
FSSI 
ROAA      0.01 
(0.01) 
     -0.03 
(0.02) 
     0.01 
(0.01) 
ROAE     
 
0.03# 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
    
 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.03# 
(0.01) 
    
 
0.03# 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
NIM     
 
0.14# 
(0.03) 
-0.02# 
(0.01) 
    
 
0.14# 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
    
 
0.04# 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
LNZ 0.34# 
(0.04) 
2.73# 
(0.35) 
0.25# 
(0.03) 
   0.31# 
(0.11) 
0.67* 
(0.31) 
0.25# 
(0.06) 
   0.68# 
(0.07) 
0.95# 
(0.14) 
0.52# 
(0.08) 
   
FSSI -0.05 
(0.09) 
-0.62 
(1.28) 
0.69# 
(0.12) 
   0.22# 
(0.08) 
3.66# 
(0.88) 
0.06 
(0.11) 
   0.42# 
(0.11) 
2.45# 
(0.94) 
0.34* 
(0.17) 
   
EF 0.01 
(0.01) 
0.16# 
(0.06) 
-0.05# 
(0.01) 
 
 
-0.04# 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.07 
(0.25) 
-0.14# 
(0.06) 
 
 
0.16# 
(0.03) 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.11# 
(0.04) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
 
 
-0.03# 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
REG1 0.01 
(0.04) 
0.28 
(0.31) 
-0.11# 
(0.04) 
 
 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.10* 
(0.05) 
1.13# 
(0.31) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
 
 
0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.08 
(0.05) 
0.12 
(0.20) 
-0.07 
(0.09) 
 
 
0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
REG2 -0.05# 
(0.02) 
-1.13# 
(0.25) 
0.14# 
(0.03) 
 
 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.12* 
(0.06) 
-0.89# 
(0.38) 
0.08 
(0.07) 
 
 
-0.10 
(0.06) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.14# 
(0.04) 
0.22* 
(0.10) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
 
 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
CORR1 -0.08 
(0.05) 
-0.54 
(0.55) 
-0.14# 
(0.06) 
 
 
-0.15# 
(0.05) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.04 
(0.09) 
-0.27 
(0.52) 
-0.12 
(0.10) 
 
 
0.11 
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
0.09 
(0.05) 
-0.58# 
(0.15) 
-0.25# 
(0.09) 
 
 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
CORR2 0.07 
(0.04) 
1.21# 
(0.50) 
-0.01 
(0.06) 
 
 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.12 
(0.09) 
-0.78 
(0.54) 
0.11 
(0.11) 
 
 
-0.11 
(0.08) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.05 
(0.04) 
-0.69# 
(0.15) 
0.37# 
(0.09) 
 
 
0.10# 
(0.02) 
-0.03# 
(0.01) 
DISCL -0.66# 
(0.24) 
-7.54# 
(2.39) 
-1.56# 
(0.28) 
 
 
1.14# 
(0.25) 
0.12# 
(0.03) 
-1.06 
(0.71) 
-3.14 
(4.43) 
-0.40 
(1.04) 
 
 
1.93# 
(0.69) 
1.45# 
(0.22) 
-1.18# 
(0.27) 
-0.08 
(0.56) 
-0.99* 
(0.49) 
 
 
0.91# 
(0.18) 
0.31# 
(0.03) 
C -0.21 
(0.39) 
-2.29 
(4.49) 
5.86# 
(0.56) 
 
 
3.88# 
(0.48) 
-0.11 
(0.09) 
0.08 
(2.66) 
6.14 
(16.67) 
10.48# 
(4.01) 
 
 
-9.15# 
(2.20) 
0.22 
(0.74) 
-0.05 
(0.63) 
-4.37* 
(1.99) 
2.03* 
(0.94) 
 
 
2.12# 
(0.27) 
-0.77# 
(0.17) 
R.sq 0.09 0.09 0.15  0.15 0.04 0.11 0.14 0.07  0.12 0.14 0.12 -4.37* 
(1.99) 
0.04  0.09 0.10 
F 
test/Wald 
χ2 
113.84 
(0.00) 
109.36 
(0.00) 
325.74 
(0.00) 
 
 
175.85 
(0.00) 
127.72 
(0.00) 
18.95 
(0.00) 
73.25 
(0.00) 
38.87 
(0.00) 
 
 
58.94 
(0.00) 
88.35 
(0.00) 
106.93 
(0.00) 
176.53 
(0.00) 
73.81 
(0.00) 
 
 
117.13 
(0.00) 
179.30 
(0.00) 
Obs. 1485 1485 1485  1487 1485 392 392 392  392 393 1655 1653 1654  1655 1653 
 Table 8 
Empirical results by the specialization of a financial institution (2SLS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression; * denotes statistical significance at 5% and # denotes statistical significance at 1%. Values of standard errors in parentheses.  
Source: Authors calculations 
  
 Model specification 
Variable COMMERCIAL  COOPERATIVE INVESTMENT 
 (1) 
ROAA 
(2) 
ROAE 
(3) 
NIM 
 
(4) 
ln Z 
(5) 
FSSI 
(1) 
ROAA 
(2) 
ROAE 
(3) 
NIM 
 
(4) 
ln Z 
(5) 
FSSI 
(1) 
ROAA 
(2) 
ROAE 
(3) 
NIM 
 
(4) 
ln Z 
(5) 
FSSI 
ROAA      0.03# 
(0.01) 
     -0.08# 
(0.02) 
     0.01 
(0.01) 
ROAE     
 
0.04# 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
    
 
0.03# 
(0.01) 
0.03# 
(0.01) 
    0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
NIM     
 
0.03# 
(0.01) 
0.03# 
(0.01) 
    
 
0.23# 
(0.05) 
-0.03# 
(0.01) 
    0.35# 
(0.04) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
LNZ 0.55# 
(0.06) 
2.16# 
(0.20) 
0.28# 
(0.07) 
   0.17# 
(0.07) 
1.77* 
(0.87) 
0.36# 
(0.07) 
   0.84# 
(0.15) 
1.65# 
(0.53) 
0.83# 
(0.11) 
   
FSSI 0.35# 
(0.08) 
1.70* 
(0.73) 
0.44# 
(0.13) 
   -0.31 
(0.26) 
3.17 
(3.18) 
-1.57# 
(0.39) 
   2.36 
(2.48) 
-5.83 
(22.24) 
-2.36 
(2.13) 
   
EF -0.03# 
(0.01) 
0.11# 
(0.03) 
-0.03# 
(0.01) 
 
 
-0.03# 
(0.01) 
0.03# 
(0.01) 
0.03# 
(0.01) 
0.59# 
(0.12) 
-0.08# 
(0.02) 
 
 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.38# 
(0.11) 
0.05* 
(0.02) 
 -0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.03# 
(0.01) 
REG1 -0.10# 
(0.03) 
0.73# 
(0.16) 
-0.35# 
(0.05) 
 
 
0.06# 
(0.02) 
-0.03# 
(0.01) 
0.08# 
(0.03) 
0.80* 
(0.36) 
-0.10 
(0.07) 
 
 
0.04 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.15 
(0.10) 
0.71 
(0.68) 
-0.09 
(0.09) 
 -0.05 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
REG2 0.02 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.10) 
-0.14# 
(0.05) 
 
 
0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.03# 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.44 
(0.39) 
0.13 
(0.07) 
 
 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.17* 
(0.09) 
-1.14 
(0.63) 
0.15* 
(0.08) 
 -0.04 
(0.05) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
CORR1 0.07 
(0.04) 
-0.71# 
(0.14) 
0.03 
(0.08) 
 
 
-0.06# 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.15# 
(0.06) 
-0.34 
(0.55) 
-0.66# 
(0.18) 
 
 
0.18* 
(0.09) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.34 
(0.27) 
0.38 
(1.29) 
-0.18 
(0.20) 
 -0.20 
(0.13) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
CORR2 -0.03 
(0.04) 
-1.03# 
(0.15) 
0.51# 
(0.07) 
 
 
0.05# 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.14# 
(0.04) 
0.61 
(0.49) 
0.59# 
(0.17) 
 
 
-0.12 
(0.08) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.19 
(0.19) 
-0.51 
(0.92) 
0.13 
(0.14) 
 0.02 
(0.09) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
DISCL -0.88# 
(0.22) 
-2.15# 
(0.78) 
-1.12# 
(0.43) 
 
 
0.85# 
(0.14) 
0.31# 
(0.03) 
1.09 
(0.61) 
13.23* 
(7.02) 
-0.41 
(1.04) 
 
 
-3.12# 
(0.86) 
-0.01 
(0.20) 
-2.65# 
(0.58) 
-4.51 
(2.65) 
-1.41# 
(0.56) 
 2.19# 
(0.18) 
0.03# 
(0.01) 
C 1.51# 
(0.50) 
-4.22# 
(1.80) 
5.84# 
(0.68) 
 
 
2.05# 
(0.23) 
-0.56# 
(0.10) 
-3.46# 
(0.96) 
-50.31# 
(11.63) 
6.29# 
(1.62) 
 
 
5.89# 
(1.33) 
0.21 
(0.25) 
-0.96 
(1.39) 
-14.19 
(8.56) 
-2.23 
(1.52) 
 1.54 
(0.97) 
0.06# 
(0.02) 
R.squared 0.10 0.12 0.07  0.10 0.05 0.16 0.22 0.32  0.20 0.15 0.36 0.10 0.39  0.43 0.08 
Wald χ2 149.48 
(0.00) 
561.02 
(0.00) 
239.76 
(0.00) 
 
 
216.70 
(0.00) 
195.82 
(0.00) 
40.22 
(0.00) 
49.33 
(0.00) 
141.77 
(0.00) 
 
 
67.78 
(0.00) 
27.37 
(0.00) 
56.68 
(0.00) 
39.54 
(0.00) 
87.72 
(0.00) 
 342.53 
(0.00) 
28.30 
(0.00) 
Obs. 2523 2522 2523  2524 2523 225 225 225  225 225 151 151 151  152 151 
Table 8 (continued) 
Empirical results by the specialization of a financial institution (2SLS) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression; * denotes statistical significance at 5% and # denotes statistical significance at 1%. Values of standard errors in parentheses.  
Source: Authors calculations 
 
 
 
 
 Model specification 
 REAL ESTATE AND MORTGAGE  SAVINGS OTHER FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
Variable (1) 
ROAA 
(2) 
ROAE 
(3) 
NIM 
 
(4) 
ln Z 
(5) 
FSSI 
(1) 
ROAA 
(2) 
ROAE 
(3) 
NIM 
 
(4) 
ln Z 
(5) 
FSSI 
(1) 
ROAA 
(2) 
ROAE 
(3) 
NIM 
 
(4) 
ln Z 
(5) 
FSSI 
ROAA      -0.01 
(0.01) 
     0.06# 
(0.02) 
     0.01 
(0.01) 
ROAE     
 
0.05# 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
    
 
0.03# 
(0.01) 
-0.03# 
(0.01) 
    
 
0.03# 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
NIM     
 
0.27# 
(0.04) 
-0.04# 
(0.01) 
    
 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
0.03# 
(0.01) 
    
 
0.08# 
(0.02) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
LNZ 0.23# 
(0.06) 
2.06# 
(0.52) 
0.38# 
(0.08) 
   0.21# 
(0.07) 
1.20# 
(0.49) 
-0.16 
(0.15) 
   0.55# 
(0.14) 
2.07# 
(0.47) 
0.21# 
(0.06) 
   
FSSI -1.82 
(2.40) 
7.74 
(10.53) 
-3.20* 
(1.52) 
   1.77# 
(0.30) 
-0.39 
(1.38) 
4.89# 
(0.72) 
   0.49 
(0.35) 
4.99# 
(1.59) 
0.62 
(0.37) 
   
EF -0.06# 
(0.02) 
-0.13 
(0.12) 
-0.06 
(0.03) 
 
 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.39# 
(0.06) 
-0.14# 
(0.03) 
 
 
0.05# 
(0.01) 
0.03# 
(0.01) 
-0.05* 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.08) 
-0.10# 
(0.02) 
 
 
0.03# 
(0.01) 
0.02* 
(0.01) 
REG1 -0.27 
(0.22) 
-1.03 
(0.64) 
0.05 
(0.13) 
 
 
-0.19* 
(0.09) 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
0.51* 
(0.27) 
-0.13 
(0.07) 
 
 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.08) 
0.54 
(0.41) 
-0.27# 
(0.08) 
 
 
0.06 
(0.05) 
-0.03# 
(0.01) 
REG2 -0.15 
(0.13) 
0.13 
(0.41) 
-0.30# 
(0.12) 
 
 
0.03 
(0.08) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.24 
(0.19) 
0.05 
(0.09) 
 
 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.06 
(0.07) 
-0.70# 
(0.30) 
-0.04 
(0.06) 
 
 
0.07* 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
CORR1 -0.22 
(0.41) 
0.53 
(0.92) 
0.01 
(0.19) 
 
 
-0.51# 
(0.16) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.08) 
-0.77* 
(0.38) 
-0.18 
(0.18) 
 
 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.12) 
-0.52 
(0.37) 
0.02 
(0.11) 
 
 
-0.05 
(0.05) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
CORR2 0.13 
(0.10) 
-0.81 
(0.65) 
0.73# 
(0.20) 
 
 
0.02 
(0.10) 
0.03# 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.07) 
-0.01 
(0.40) 
0.35* 
(0.16) 
 
 
-0.06 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.16* 
(0.08) 
-0.02 
(0.32) 
0.38# 
(0.09) 
 
 
0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
DISCL 2.81* 
(1.29) 
3.40 
(4.74) 
-0.44 
(1.28) 
 
 
0.86 
(0.71) 
0.11# 
(0.02) 
-1.34# 
(0.40) 
-0.49 
(2.68) 
-2.29 
(1.87) 
 
 
1.31# 
(0.32) 
0.39# 
(0.10) 
-1.38 
(1.02) 
6.61 
(4.60) 
-1.31 
(0.77) 
 
 
-0.16 
(1.56) 
0.39# 
(0.11) 
C 2.77 
(1.90) 
7.38 
(8.56) 
5.07* 
(2.42) 
 
 
2.11 
(1.50) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
0.31 
(0.75) 
-21.16# 
(3.46) 
13.20# 
(1.70) 
 
 
-0.83 
(0.61) 
-1.19# 
(0.15) 
3.49 
(2.02) 
-6.21 
(5.46) 
9.22# 
(1.17) 
 
 
0.72 
(1.21) 
-0.58# 
(0.22) 
R.sq 0.07 0.15 0.36  0.28 0.12 0.26 0.14 0.32  0.21 0.43 0.10 0.10 0.21  0.10 0.10 
Wald χ2 33.01 
(0.00) 
28.28 
(0.00) 
105.89 
(0.00) 
 
 
77.75 
(0.00) 
67.07 
(0.00) 
67.43 
(0.00) 
106.84 
(0.00) 
111.86 
(0.00) 
 
 
72.09 
(0.00) 
147.59 
(0.00) 
50.49 
(0.00) 
93.96 
(0.00) 
165.98 
(0.00) 
 
 
45.12 
(0.00) 
23.95 
(0.00) 
Obs. 194 194 194  194 194 325 324 324  324 324 475 475 475  476 475 
Table A1. Composite Index of Disclosure 
𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶 =
1
17
∑ 𝑠𝑖
17
𝑖=1  ; where 𝑠𝑖 are the sub-indexes of disclosure. 
 
Disclosure indices  
 Sub-index – si Categories 
Assets 
Loans Loans by maturity Sub three months, three to six months, six months to one year, one to five 
years, more than five years 
Loans by type Loans to municipalities/government, mortgages, HP/lease, other loans 
Loans by counterparty Loans to group companies, loans to other corporate, loans to banks 
Problem loans Total problem loans 
Problem loans by type Overdue/restructured/other non-performing 
Securities by type Detailed breakdown: Treasury bills, other bills, bonds, CDs, equity 
investments, other investments 
                                           Other earning assets  Government securities, other listed securities, non-listed securities 
Securities by holding purpose Investment securities, trading securities 
Liabilities 
Deposits Deposits by maturity Demand, savings, sub three months, three to six months, six months to one 
year, one to five years, more than five years 
 Deposit by type of customer Bank deposits, municipal/government 
Other funding Money market funding Total money market funding 
 Long-term funding Convertible bonds, mortgage bonds, other bonds, subordinated debt, hybrid 
capital 
Memo lines  
Reserves Loan loss reserves (memo) 
Capital Total capital ratio, tier 1 ratio, total capital, tier 1 capital 
Contingent liabilities Total contingent liabilities 
Off-balance sheet items Off-balance sheet items 
Income statement   
Non-interest income Net commission income, net fee income, net trading income 
Loan loss provisions Loan loss provision 
Source: Nier (2005). 
Table A2: Correlations among the selected variables  
 
Source: Authors calculations 
 
  
 ROAE ROAA NIM FSSI Z Zalt EF REG2 REG3 CORR1 CORR2 DISCL 
ROAE 1            
ROAA 0.34 1           
NIM -0.05 0.19 1          
FSSI 0.08 0.07 0.08 1         
 Z 0.12 0.09 0.03 -0.04 1        
Zalt 0.10 0.07 0.03 -0.04 0.99 1       
EF 0.10 -0.08 -0.16 0.11 -0.01 -0.01 1      
REG1 0.09 -0.04 -0.16 -0.07 -0.10 0.10 -0.02 1     
REG2 -0.01 -0.03 -0.10 -0.06 0.06 0.06 0.18 0.08 1    
CORR1 -0.13 0.01 0.09 0.02 -0.05 -0.05 0.03 -0.02 0.08 1   
CORR2 -0.15 0.05 0.23 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.15 -0.14 0.06 0.53 1  
DISCL 0.03 -0.04 -0.07 0.13 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.02 0.01 1 
Table A3: Description of the country samples  
 
HIGH INCOME 
UPPER MIDDLE 
INCOME 
FOUNDING 
MEMBERS 
 
EU ENLARGEMENT A 
 
EU ENLARGEMENT B 
 
CANDIDATE 
Austria 
Belgium 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Poland 
Portugal 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
United Kingdom 
Albania 
Bulgaria 
Hungary 
Macedonia 
Montenegro 
Romania 
Serbia 
Turkey 
Belgium 
Germany 
Denmark 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
The Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
Greece 
Spain 
Portugal 
Austria 
Finland 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Czech Republic 
Cyprus 
Estonia 
Hungary 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Malta 
Poland 
Romania 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
 
Albania 
Iceland 
Macedonia 
Montenegro 
Serbia 
Turkey 
528 financial 
institutions 
153 financial 
institutions 
270 financial institutions 91 financial institutions 199 financial institutions 121 financial 
institutions 
Notes: For the  2013 fiscal year, low-income economies are defined as those with a GNI per capita, calculated using the World Bank Atlas method, of $1,045 or less in 2013; middle-
income economies are those with a GNI per capita of more than $1,045 but less than $12,746; high-income economies are those with a GNI per capita of $12,746 or more. Lower-
middle-income and upper-middle-income economies are separated at a GNI per capita of $4,125. 
Founding members: comprise the founding members of 1957 and the first enlargement in 1973. EU Enlargement group A: the 2nd, 3rd and 4th enlargements (1981-1995) EU 
Enlargement group B: the 5th, 6th and 7th enlargements (2004-2013)     
